



## **UNICREDIT GROUP**

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### **COMPETING IN THE NEW NORMAL**

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Bank of America - Merrill Lynch, Banking & Insurance CEO Conference  
London, 30<sup>th</sup> September 2009

# UCG THROUGH THE CRISIS: SOME LESSONS LEARNED HELPED TO MAINTAIN A STRONG FRANCHISE

THE CRISIS LED EVERYONE TO REFLECT ON SOME KEY THEMES:

1. CENTRALITY OF FRANCHISE

2. LOSS ABSORPTION CAPACITY

3. EFFICIENT COST STRUCTURE

4. RISK MANAGEMENT AT THE CENTRE: DELEVERAGE AND DERISK

5. STRONGER CAPITAL BUFFERS NEEDED

## UNICREDIT POSITIONING RELATIVE TO KEY THEMES

At the beginning of the crisis...

... and after some tough quarters



Strong customer franchise preserved, with role as key player in CEE confirmed



Buffer to absorb credit losses remained solid, thanks to diversification



Restructuring potential activated and efficiency improved: lower cost structure, with FTE ~ -8,700 since Dec07



De-leveraging/ de-risking undertaken, with some good results



We "paid" for the effects of past acquisitions but positive capital generation has been maintained

UNICREDIT MANY QUARTERS INTO THE CRISIS:  
IMPORTANT LESSONS LEARNED

## AGENDA


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- **Strong franchise**
- Capital strengthened
- Conclusions

# STRONG FRANCHISE IN WESTERN EUROPE, LEADER IN CEE ...

FRANCHISE: DIVERSIFICATION

## TOTAL REVENUES BREAKDOWN<sup>(1)</sup>



### ■ STRONG FRANCHISE, DIVERSIFIED BY BUSINESS AND BY GEOGRAPHY


- ✓ Well diversified by business, with high focus on commercial banking
- ✓ Banking operations in 22 countries, with ~10,000 branches:
  - Top player in Italy, Germany and Austria
  - #1 in CEE

<sup>(1)</sup> FY08 & 1H09 quarterly average

# ... WITH SOLID OPERATING PERFORMANCE THROUGH THE CRISIS ...

FRANCHISE: DIVERSIFICATION


■ 2.8 bn operating profit delivered on average throughout the crisis ...




■ ... thanks to resilient commercial banking ...

■ ... and also prompt recovery of MIB

**COMMERCIAL BANKING<sup>(1)</sup>**






**MIB**



<sup>(1)</sup> Retail, Corporate, Private Banking and CEE Region. 4Q08 adjusted for 77 mln one-offs in Retail

# ... PROVIDING A CONSTANT BUFFER TO ABSORB CREDIT CYCLE DETERIORATION

## FRANCHISE: LOSS ABSORPTION CAPACITY



NOTE: buffer defined as ((operating income of the last two quarters annualized + generic provisions) / Eop Customer loans), indicating the capacity to absorb loan provisions without losses at pre-tax level

Historical figures re-stated


<sup>(1)</sup> Excl. Trading income of Western Europe

# CEE KEPT POSTING OPERATING GROWTH

FRANCHISE: CEE

- Despite the near panic by investors, which in early 2009 considered CEE virtually bankrupt, the region kept delivering constant and solid growth in the last difficult quarters

CEE REGION: OPERATING PROFIT AT CONSTANT FX  
Index figures, 1Q08 = 100



€mln  
at current FX



# UCG HAS A CLEAR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN CEE, ...

FRANCHISE: CEE


**UCG has long-dated experience in the CEE region<sup>(1)</sup> ...**



**... and a widespread franchise**

- Over 4,000 branches
- A single identity towards a sole brand

**... with a solid presence in 19 countries ...**




<sup>(1)</sup> Acquisitions done by BACA, HVB and UniCredit




# ... A REGION WITH BOTH EXPECTATIONS OF COMING MACRO RECOVERY AND UNDISPUTED LONG TERM POTENTIAL

FRANCHISE: CEE

## SHORT TERM: RECOVERY EXPECTATIONS



## LONG TERM: HIGH GROWTH POTENTIAL



■ ~75% of total UCG loans exposure in the CEE countries with higher recovery expected in 2010 (~90% in countries for which no GDP decline is expected)

■ Undisputable long term potential of the Region:

- ✓ High penetration gap to Western Europe in both Retail and Corporate
- ✓ Key role as the “manufacturing arm” of Old Europe


Note: Real GDP growth source – WIIW (the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies), data as of July 2009

(1) Source: UniCredit Group CEE Strategic Analysis, data as of Dec 08


# INCREASED FOCUS ON COST DISCIPLINE DURING THE CRISIS, BOTH IN WESTERN EUROPE AND CEE

## COST MANAGEMENT


### Constant FTE reduction is the structural driver of cost reduction



### Cost decrease trend spanned many quarters in Western Europe ...




### ... but since the crisis accelerated, CEE showed a sharp turnaround of the cost trend



Normalized: at constant FX and perimeter

# STAFF RIGHTSIZING DELIVERED ACROSS THE ENTIRE GROUP, WITH SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN RETAIL AND CEE

COST MANAGEMENT



**~ 8,700 FTEs REDUCTION IN 18 MONTHS**


**FURTHER FTEs RIGHTSIZING TO COME BY 2011, ALREADY CHARGED TO P&L**

<sup>(1)</sup> Yapi Group at 100%. Dec07 figures restated for changes in perimeter (main ones: UkrSotsbank included and BPH 200 excluded)


# RETAIL: PUSH TOWARDS ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS DELIVERING SIGNIFICANT EFFICIENCY GAINS

COST MANAGEMENT


Tellers headcount<sup>(1)</sup>



Current account transactions # operations per year (mln) and channel mix<sup>(1)</sup>



Yearly transactions per teller<sup>(1)</sup>



- Strong rise in branches' productivity, coupled with cost base reduction
- Further gains in 2009: almost 600 reduction of tellers by year end<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> Based on sample of ~2,500 branches, accounting for ~70% of Retail Italy Network operations


# RISK MANAGEMENT BROUGHT TO THE CENTRE: STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE CLEARLY RECOGNIZED

## ROLE OF CRO FUNCTION ENHANCED. NEW CRO (FROM JAN09) BRINGING ADDITIONAL EXPERTISE

<p><b>RISK APPETITE AND LOSS ABSORPTION CAPACITY</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Risk appetite, quantified and defined at Group level, guiding all decisions</li> <li>■ Change in risk appetite only possible through board approval</li> <li>■ Loss Absorption Capacity embedded in the budget process</li> </ul>
<p><b>RISK DEFINITION</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Aggregation of all risk types and translation into limits coherent with Risk Appetite and Loss Absorption Capacity</li> <li>■ Specific limits for different risks (market, liquidity, operational etc.)</li> </ul>
<p><b>RISK GOVERNANCE</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ CRO permanent member of the Executive Management Committee</li> <li>■ Fully centralized approach strengthened</li> </ul>
<p><b>RISK MONITORING</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Investments in risk infrastructures</li> <li>■ Improvement of risk culture via training</li> </ul>

# DE-RISKING ONGOING: TRADING ASSETS MORE THAN HALVED SINCE DEC07 NET OF HEDGING PRODUCTS

BALANCE SHEET: DE-RISKING




DE-RISKING IS NOT JUST A GENERIC COMMITMENT

# DE-LEVERAGING VISIBLE: TOTAL ASSETS DECREASE + RESILIENT TANGIBLE EQUITY = BETTER LEVERAGE

BALANCE SHEET:  
DE-LEVERAGING


## Total assets, bn



■ A different balance sheet, with strong reduction of:

- ✓ trading assets, -57.3% net of hedging instruments
- ✓ net interbank position, ~ -11 bn (-17.8%)

## Tangible assets/Tangible equity, excl. netting



■ Tangible assets/Tangible equity adjusted for netting agreements reduced by 1.1 to 25.3


CONSISTENT DE-LEVERAGING

# CAPITAL GENERATION CONTINUED ALSO DURING THE CRISIS

CAPITAL

■ Dec07-Jun09: The combined effect of capital increase and completion of acquisitions/ disposals is +5 bp...

■ ...net of that Core Tier I increased by 97 bp in 18 months



DESPITE THE CRISIS WE GENERATED, NOT DESTROYED, CAPITAL




## AGENDA

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- Strong franchise
- **Capital strengthened**
- Conclusions

## MOVING TO A STRONGER CAPITAL STRUCTURE

- **€4 billion Rights Issue will have an additional positive impact of 80 bp:**
  - Core Tier I Ratio  $\Rightarrow$  from 6.85% to 7.65%
  - Tier I Ratio  $\Rightarrow$  from 7.66% to 8.46%
  - Total Capital Ratio  $\Rightarrow$  from 11.33% to 12.13%
  - Leverage Ratio<sup>(1)</sup>  $\Rightarrow$  from 25.3 to 22.8



<sup>(1)</sup> Adjusted for netting agreements

## TERMS OF THE RIGHTS ISSUE (PROPOSAL TO THE EGM)

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### Offering Structure

- €4 billion
- Issuance of new ordinary shares with pre-emptive rights to all current shareholders
- Also saving shareholders will be entitled to subscribe new ordinary shares

### Pricing

- Final terms to be decided according to market conditions at the time of launch of the offering

### Underwriting

- Full commitment to underwrite the entire amount of the Rights Issue, subject to standard terms and conditions for this type of transaction
- UniCredit Corporate and Investment Banking and Bank of America Merrill Lynch as Joint Global Coordinators and Joint Bookrunners; Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, Mediobanca and UBS as Joint Bookrunners

### Timing of the Offering

- UniCredit EGM expected in mid-November 2009 to approve the Rights Issue
- Launch of the Offering expected in January 2010, subject to regulatory approval
- Completion expected by 1Q2010

## CAPITAL INCREASE RATIONALE

### WHAT WILL CHANGE

- **Permanent strengthening of Core Capital, removing uncertainty**
  - ✓ anticipating new regulatory environment
  - ✓ fully accounted by Rating Agencies
  - ✓ in line with market's changed expectations
  - ✓ further improvement of Balance Sheet structure
- **Flexible capital allocation to capture opportunities from recovery**
- **Opportunity for a sustainable dividend policy**

### WHAT WILL NOT CHANGE

- **UCG business model, rooted in a unique franchise in Western, Central and Eastern Europe**
- **Value creation driven by focus on core business and organic growth**
- **Disciplined capital and risk management**

**REINFORCING THE GROUP WITH A MARKET SOLUTION, CONFIRMING  
UCG'S STRATEGY**

## AGENDA

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- Strong franchise
- Capital strengthened
- **Conclusions**

# COMPETING IN THE NEW NORMAL: A STRONG CAPITAL IS A CALL ON FRANCHISE



**SOME THINGS WILL CHANGE, OTHERS WILL COME BACK:  
A SOLID FRANCHISE AND STRONG CAPITAL WILL PROVE A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE**

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